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STATEME;NT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This cas'e is a boundary lillle dispute case brought by
San Juan County, Utah, a;s Plaintiff, seeking a1n injunction against the Defendant Grand County's continued exercise o:f jurisdiction over an area "approximately 2/3 of a
mile wide" between the Colorado border and the Green
Rdver. The Plaintiff also seeks a judgment for the tax
money adtrnirttedly colltected in said disputed area by Grand
County. Gra!Ild County, on the other hand, counterclaimed
and in its Counterclaim ·contends that old surveys conducted by the parties and others and acquies0ed in over a
long period of time creates- the tTue and correct common
boundary betw~e·n the two counties.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court held that it did not have jurisdiction to hear and determine the issue·s presented to it,
either on the Plaintiff's Complaint or on the Defendant's
Counterclaim and dismissed the Plaintiff's Complaint and
the Defendant's Counterclaim and awarded costs to the
Defendant; the Defendant appeals and the Plaintiff crosBappeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seek's a reversal of that porti'Onl of the judgment 01:f the lower court that holds that the court did not
have jurisdiction to hear and determine the isiSues presented to it by the Defendant's Countercbim, and from
that portion of the judgment and decree dismissing Defendant's Counterclaim and seeros· a decree establishing
that as a matter of law the common boundary between the
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two counties is the line found by the trial court to have
been surveyed lby mutual com sent and by the joint effort
of thte· two counties pursuant to Utah Law. It is also the
position of the Defendant that the line found by the Court
to have been surveyed and marked on the ground by the
two count:i!e·s corresponds to the south line of Township 26
South and as a matter of law said line so established and
acquiesced in for a long period of tim•e create·s a boundary
by prescription and estoppel and should be declared to be
the common boundary line be:twe-en the two counties.
It is the further contention of the Defendant that the
Parallel 38°30' North Latitude as fixed by the State Legislature and as hi·storically marked on the ancient maps
and plats and acquiesced in by both Grand and San Juan
Counties is the common boundary line betwe-en the two
counties as a matter of law; that once so established and
fixed neither the State Enginee·r nor the Legislature itself
can declare said boundary line to be otherwise.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On December 18, 1958, for the first time, a judicial
determination of the common boundary between Grand
and San Ju'an Counties was brought by San Juan County
in an effort on the part of San Juam County to obtain an
order of the court for an accounting and money judgment
against the Defendant for taxets admittedly collected by
the Defendant in the disputed area and to restrain the
Defendant from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the
so-called "disputed area," which the Plaintiff alleges to be
a line on Parallel 38°30' North Latitude and which it states
in its Complaint is "approximately 2/3 of a mile north of
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the south boundary line of Township 26 South," (Paragraph
15 of Plaintiff's Complaint) as determined by a reconnaissance performed by the Corus:t and Geodetic Survey hranch
of the F1ederal Governm,enrt at the request of the State
Engineer. The Defendant Grand County admits that it has
exerdsed jurisdiction and control over said disputed area
and that it had collected the taXIe·s in the so-called "disputed
area" and would continue to do so unless restrained by
order of the Court. (See paragraph 10 of PLaintiff's Complaint and paragraph 10 of Defendant's Amended Answer
and Counterclaim). Defendant Grand County contends that
the two counties had, by mutual consent and joint effort,
surveyed the common boundary and that thereafter both
counties acquiesced in said line as the boundary line for a
long period of time, thus establishing the common boundary between said counties, which line it so happens is
coincident with the south line of Township 2,6 South as it
thas come to be marked on the· earth's surface, and further
contends that all of the early surveys placed the common
boundary and Parallel 38°30' North Latitude on a line coincident with the south line of Township 26 South.
On the 18th day of November, A.D., 1960, a pre-trial
order of the· Court framed the i~ssues as follows:
"1. Wh1at was the boundary between the plaintiff
and the defendant orf 1896, at th1e time the State of Utah
was adn1itted to rthe Union.

2. What is the common boundary line between the
parties as of the present timie.
3. Where is the boundary line to be established
surface of the earth.

on the
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4. What amount of taxes, if any, collected by Grand
County is the pl1aintiff entitled rto; and whether or not the
Statute of Limitations applies to this is,sue.
5. Whether or not the parties have acquiesCled in the
boundary now established upon the surface of the earth."
The :iJs,sues thus joined the case were presented to
the trial court, the question of taxes payable from Grand
County to San Juan County being deferred by the Court
until after the location orf the common boundary had been
disposed of.
The evidence presented disclosed that all of the· old
maps show the :south line of Township 26 South to be the
common boundary between the two counties while the more
recent ones show the common boundary to be somewhat
nomh of the south line orf Township 26 South.
The old Bureau of Land Management township plat1s
which are on file in the State Land Office show Parallel
38°30' North Latitude to be either just south of or as being
the same line as the south line o;f Township 26 South.
In the year 1912 the two counties, by mutual agreement, conducted a joint survey to ascertain and mark the
common boundary between the two counties.
In the year 1958, Gra:nd and San Juan Counties engaged the s·erviCies of the State Engineer to determine as
best he could the location orf Parallel 38°30' North Latitude.
The State Engineer never conducted any surv!e·y or placed
any monuments upon 38°30' North Latitude or at any other
place pursuant to said employment but did request th~
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Coast and Geodetic Department of the Federal Government
to conduct a reconnaissanCie which was done. No further
steps were taken and the project wws wbandoned.
At the conclusion of the evidence the court took the
caSie under advisement 'rund on the 12th day of September,
1961, the trial court made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, which facts found read in words
and figur.es as follows, to-wit:
FINDINGS OF FACT
"1. That the Plaintiff San Juan County is now, and
ever since February 17, 1880, has been, a body corporate
and politic of either the Territory af Utah or of the State
of Utah.
2. That the Defendant Grand County i~ now and
sinete March 13, 1890, has been a body cnrporate and
politic of either the Terr:Utory of Utah or the State o[
Utah.

3. That the oom.mon boundary line between Grand
and San Juan Counties as defined by the Territ·orial
Legislatui~e of the Territory of UtaJh, and later by the
Legislature of the State of Utah, hajs never varied and
has always been described as Parallel 38°30' North
L'atitude.
4. That the State Legislature provided a means
for the detemnination of the location o[ boundary lines
upon the ground in the event of a dispute between couruti~s and this method has remained substantially the
same through the years and is presently identified as
Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
5. That sometime in 1958, ·the two counties en-
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gaged the State Engineer to survey and mark the eo!mmon boundary line between the two counties. The State
Engineer never conduct1ed any survey or placed any
monuments on Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude, or any
other place pursuant to said employment but requested
the Goa&t and Geodetic Department of the Federal Government to do a reconnlaissantce survey, which was conducted by said Ooasrt and Geodetic Department of the
Federal Government. No further .steps were taken and
the project was abandoned.
6. There is evidence in the record that in the year
1912, the County surveyors of the Plaintiff and Defend-

ant Counties surveyed the common boundary line between the two counties and there iJs evidence of monume·nts and other markings being made, but the exact
location thereof cannot now be determined.
7. That the procedure set forth by the Legislature
for determining County boundaries in case of dispute
has not been complied with by the parties~.

The Court concluded from the fol"egoing facts that it
did not ihave jurisdiction in this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT N0.1
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear and dete·rmine the issues presenrted to it by the Defendant's Counterclaim and in the light of the 'evidence presented the
Defendant Grand County iJs entitled to a judgment as a.
matter (jf law establishing the· line found by the Court to
have been surveyed, marked and monumented by the
mutual consent and agreement of the- two cou111ties to be
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the true common boundary line between the two counties.
The Court has j ur:Usdiction to determine this matter.
In 20 C. J. S.. Counrt;ies, Section 21, page 772, it is s•tated:
"Suit in Equity. In the absence of such a statute a court
of equity has j urisdietion to detemJ.ine the true location of
a d]sputed boundary between counties, and, if necessary,
cause the line to he marked by permanent monuments."
Article VIII, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution
states: "The District Court shall have original jurisdiction
in all matters civil and criminal not excepted by :this· Constitution, and not prohibited by law; appellate jurisdiction
from all inferior courts and tribunals, and a supervisory
control of sam·e. The Diistrict Courts or any judge thereof,
shall h·ave the power to .issue writs of Habeas Corpus, mandamus, injunctions, give warrants, certiorari prohibitions
and other writs nece•ssary to carry into effect the orders,
judgments. and decre:es, and to give them general control
over inferior Courts and tribunals within their respective
j urisdi•ctions."
The Statutes disclose, and the Court fuund, that "the
Legislature provided a mea.ns for determilllirng the location
of boundary lines upon the ground in the event of dispute
or uncertainty between counties and this method has remained substantially the same, through the years and is
pres1ently identified as Section 17-1-33, Utah Code Annotated, 1953," and which reads as follows:
"17-1-33. Disputed boundaries- DeterminationWhenever any dispute or uncertainty shall ariJs.e as to
amy county boundary the same may be determined by
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the county surveyors of the counties interested, and in
case they fail to agree or otherwise· fail to establish the
boundary, the board of county commissioners of either
or ~both counties interested shall engage the· services of
the state engineer who, with the aforesaid county surveyors, or either of them, if but one appears for that purpos,e, all having received due and proper notice, shall
proceed forthwith to permanently determine such boundary line by making the necessary surveys and erecting
suitable m'Onuments to de·s,ignate the boundaries, which
shall be deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment. Nothing in this s:ection shall he construed to give the surveyors or state engineer any further authority than to erect suitable monum:e·nts to
des,ignate boundaries as they are now estwblished by law.
History: R. S. 1898 Sec. 487; L. 1907 Ch 82, Sec.
1; C. L. 1907 Sec. 487; C. L. 1917 Sec. 1322; R, S, 1933
and C. 1943, 19-1-33."
The Defendant Grand County's first point on this
appeal i's that when a county line has been run and marked
on the ground in accordance with law by the agents designated by the Legislature for that purpose that it is conclusive a.nd can only be changed by legislative enactment and
that where the trial ~court round the facts to exist the court
has jurisdiction and must issue an order accordingly.
The Findings of the trial court, above quoted with
respect to the joint survey of the two counties and the
markings a.nd monumenting of the line, are fully ·supported
by the evidence submitted to the trial court.
The minutes of the meetings of the Plaintiff San Juan
County were introduced in evidence by the Defendant
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Grand County and the uncontradicted testimony of C. R.
C!hristensen, former official of Sam Juan County, confirmed
the fact that a joint survey by the counties to thi;s action
was conducted by the two counties, whose agents marked
and monum·ented the common boundary line between said
counties from the Colorado border to the Green River.
(Def'endant's Exhibits, 129 through 139.)
C. R. Christensen, a former A'Ssessor of San Juan
County, testified on February 14, 1961, (Transcript of Trial
Proceeding!&, Volume II, page 453 through 485) parts of
whicih will be set forth £or the benefit of the Court as
follows:
"Q. Mr. Chritstensen do you know whether or not the
boundary line between Grand County and San Juam. County
has ever been surveyed? (Lines 22-23-24, page 455.)

A.

Yes, Sir. (Line 25, page 455.)

Q.

When to the best of your recollection? (Lines

4-5, pa.ge 456.)

A. The fall and summer of 1912 is the best of my
recollection. That is the 'survey I was on anyway. (Lines
6-7-8, page 456.)
Q.

Did you participate in it? (Lines 9-10, page 456.)

A.

Yes, sir. (Line 11, page 456.)

Q. Well, will you tell us who
there? (Lines 19-20, page 458.)

YQU

remember to be

A. There was Harry Preston, Gene Rogerson, Andrew Middlemist, IDYiSe1f amd Branson. I believe his name
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was Tom Branson. He was one of the Commissioners from
Grand County. The Chairman, I understood. (Lines 22-2324, page 458.)
Q.

Now who wrus Harry Preston? (Lines 25-26,

page 458.)

A. He· was a. young surveyor that came to this country and married a Monticello girl. . . . . (Lines 27 through
30, page 458; lines 1-2-3, page 459.)
Q. Where was Harry Preston living at that time?
(Lines 4-5, page 459.)

A.

This was his hoone. (Line 6, page 459.)

Q. You mean Moab when you say this? (Lines 7-8,
page 459.)

A. Yes, sir, she was living with her mother, and
when he was at home ihe was with her. (Lines 9-10,
page 459.)
Q. Tell us what you know about Middlemist. (Lines
22-23, page 459.)

A. He lived at Monticello, e·ast of there, and homesteaded there. (Li~ne~s 24-25, page 459.)
Q.

What was his profession? (Lines 26-27, page

459.)

A. He had worked with a surveyor by the name of
E. C. Laure. In fact, quite a surveyor, that is not a surveyor but a lineman. That is what they called him. (Lines
28-29-30, page 459.)
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Q What did you do and what did you see done?
(Lines 24-25, page 461.)

A Well, I helped tend camp around there and done
some chaining and the boys, Preston and Middlemist, were
trying to determine the starting point on that State line to
run the line west to determine the line ibetween the two
counties. (Lines 26 through 30, page 461.)
Beginning on page 462 throuwh line 18, page 467) C.
R. Christensen testifh~d as follows :
"Q.

A.

Did they :e!Stablish a starting point?
Yes, sir.

When they established the starting point how
did they mark it?
Q.

A. Well, I couldn't tell you definitely. I saw them
mark it .and saw them start, but I couldn't tell you justthey piled up 1some rock. Oh, we were there a day or two.
I couldn't tell you what happened.
Q.

T:hey did pile up some rock?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

Then after you started what did, what was done

up there?
A.

They started running a line directly west.

Q. Well to your best recollection can you tell us
what they did in running this line?

A.

W·eU, sometimes they could chain, but they did

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
more in lining and putting up monuments so they could
trace it.
Q.

Did they set up instruments?

A.

Yes, sir.

And then with these instruments they surveyed
a line, is that correct?
Q.

A. Well, I don't know whether they did anything
elise. They looked th~ough a transit. I looked through it
several times, and a number of the other boys.
Q.

Now, did you put marks on this line?

A. Yes, sir.
What, can you describe some of the mark!s that
were placed on it?
Q.

A. Yes, sir. Some of them. They were when there
were rock handy, they piled up a pretty good pile of rock
and Rogerson had the job of marking thos·e rocks with a
hammer and coal chis·el. 'Tihat was hi1s joib mainly. But he
didn't stay right on the job because-

Well, describe one of these monuments, if you
can. One of the rock monuments. How large it was and
so forth.
Q.

A. Well, it depended a little on how plentiful the
rock were. Sometimes larger. But they aimed to put them
about four f·eet high where the rock was handy, and tlhe
base, it was bigger around on the bottom than the top.
It sloped up.
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Did you mark them in places where there weren't
rock? How did you mark them in those plac:es?
Q.

A. Well, there was trees some of the way. Very
thick trees. And they had trouble getting througih thos:e
trees, and they would off-set, he called it. 'Dhey would
measure a distance, if that was th:e erust and west line, or
north and south line, east and west line, they would measoff a chain or so many links 1south trying to find those
marks .....
Q. Now am I correret, then, in other wordls, where
the trees were real thick and they couldn't get through
they made some off-sets?

A.

Yes, sir.

Now, do you know whether or not they made
any marks on trees?
Q.

A.

Yes,sir.

Q.

How did they do that?

A. 'llh:ey would bark them. I had a little axe of my
own. I would, what we called scalping down the side. And
this Rogerson, well, Andy, mostly, had a hammer that he
would knock a mark in to them. Give tlhe initials.
Now you said you started on the eaJSt line. That
would he· on the boundary between Colorado and Utah?
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

And you pr-oceeded west, i.s that correct?

A.

Yes, sir.
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Q. Now how far west did you go, Mr. Chdsrtensen?

A. To tJhe Green River.
Q.

To the Gre·en River?

A. Yes, sir. I and two others in the party started
out. Some didn't go through. They changed some of the
crew at the Saw Mill. Branson was. Another man, he had
a partner the-re. Can't speak hils name right now, but I know
it if I hear it.
Q.

Did you yourself go all the way to the Green

River?
A.

Yes,s ir.

As-now, during this survey were there people
there from both counties?
Q.

A.

Yes, sir.

MR. BURTON:
Q.

We made a.n objection there.

Who was the·re from Grand County?

A. Well, there was different men at different times,
but Branson was all the way until we got in this valley,
or this valley south of UJs here, and for some--well, he helped
back of the rocks here too. So they had quite a time getting
lined up that, over that cliff, what they called back of the
rocks And he was with us.

*
Q.

*

*

*

Did you go through that area, the Poverty Fla:ts?

A. Yes, sir.
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Q.

And then over back of the rocks. Is that what

you said?
A.

Y:es, sir. West, yes, sir.

Q.

Do you know who else was :from Grand County?

A.

Yes,-

* * * *
A. Yes. There was, well, now, just where they came
on. Joe Hammond was with from over back of the rockls.
He had sheep in that neighborhood, and he wanted to know
where the line was.
Q.

And Harry Preston, is he one?

A.

Harry Preston and Middlemist.

Q.

Was Middlemist from Grand or San Juan

County?
A. He was from San Juan mostly. 'lihat is where he
homesteaded. He was an unmarried man.
Q.

Now who was from San Juan County other than

yourself?
A.

Rogerson and Middlemist.

Q.

Were you acquainted with Mr. Hyde?

A.

What Hyde? There's several of them.

Q. Do you know wlhethe-r or not a Hyde was a
commissioner at that time in 1910?

A. Yes, sir.
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Q.

What were his initials?

A.

F. H., Frank H. Hyde.

Q Were you acquainted with him?
A.

Quite well.

Q. Nnw during that time did you ever have a conversation with Mr. Hyde concerning a boundary line?
A. Prior to tlhat time I had. Not while we were
running the line I didn't.

Q. Mr. Christensen, do you know what the purpose
of this 1survey was?
A.

Yes, sir.

Q. What was the purpose of the survey?
A. My understanding was to determine the line between the two counties, there was dissatisfaction between
the commissioners and the patrons in that county, and
some in thi·s. It was my understanding that was the reason
for the survey."

The uncontradicted and only evidence on the subject
of the existence of the disputed or uncertain boundary between Grand and San Juan Counti'e·s and the joint effort
of the two counties to resolve same is presented above and
is in complete and absolute harmony with the trial court's
Finding No.6 that the·re was such a survey and monumenting pursuant to the statute referred to in the Court's Finding No.4.
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The uncontradicted testimony of Richard 0. Cozzens,
Civil Engineer and Land Surveyor, coupled with the 'be·stimony of old-time residents and viewed in the light of the
old maps and plats demonstrates that Parallel 38°30' North
Latitude as determined by all the surveyoi'!s at the time of
the joint effort of the two counties was on a line coincident
with the south line of Township 26 South.
Richard 0. Cozzens, Civil Engineer and Land Surveyor, uncontradicted testimony shoWls that on February
1, 1961, h:e drove to a point on the south line of Township
26 South, where were two signs, one facing south reading
"Entering Grand County" (See Defendant's Exhibit 109)
and the other facing north l}eading "Entering San Juan
County" (See Defendant's Exhibit 159) Transcript of
frial Proceedings, Vol. II, lines 14 through 19 and 25
through 28, page 402, and lines 9 through 23, page 426.)
'Tihat in running a line east and west from said points
he :found a pile of stones which showed extreme effects of
the elements and looked aged. (Lines 7-8, pag 425.) He
took pictures of them, which are identified as Defendant's
E~hibits 47 and 48; some distance therefrom he found other
stones in a straight line indicating the boundary line. (Defendant's Exhibit 145.)
On February ·6, 1961, Witness Cozze·ns found a blazed
pine tree about 30 feet south of a straight line from the
monuments identified aJS Exhibits 47, 38 and 145. The blazes
sihowed extreme signs of weathering and age. (See Tra.ns.cript lines 6 through 16, page 421, and Defendant's Exhibit 162.)
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Witness Cozzellls' uncontradicted testimony shows
that the old monuments established by the joint survey of
the two counties are located on a. line which for all practical
purposes corresponds with the s·outh line of Township 26
South, Salt Lake Bas.e and Meridian.
Witness R. L. Holyoak's uncontradicted testimony
identified the Exhibits referred to above by Witness
Cozzens and stated that ihe has been in the area for about
fifty-four ye·ars (Transcript of Trial P:r.oceedings, Vol. II,
page 340, lines 7 and 8) and that he could not rem·emher
a time when these marks were not there.
The joint surve·y conducted by the two counties
placed tlhe common boundary om a line which has come to
be known aJs the south line of Township 26 South, which
fact is not strange since the surveyors were using the
same methods and the same kind of instruments that
were used by the· early government surveyors who placed
Parallel 38°30' North Latitude on a line coinciding with
the south line of Township 26 South, Salt Lake Ba·se and
Meridian. It is conspicuous that the only fixed location on
the .earth's surface referred to in the Plaintiff's Complaint
is a reference to the ·south line of Township 26 South.
Another aid in fixing the location of a common boundary between the two counties which the trial court apparently neglected to consider when stating that the joint
survey marked and monumented in 1912, "could not now
be determined" was the fact that after said joint survey
was completed San Juan County acquiesced in its fixed
location and ihas never sought any legislative or judicial
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determination of its common boundary with Grand County
until this suit was commenced by it on December 18, 1958.
In 20 C. J. S. (Counties) Section 21, Page 772, it is
stated : "Where the boundary line between two counties is
uncertain in view of legislative acts and other matters of
which the Court takes judicial knowledge, extrinsic evidence ils admissible in determining the boundary. The evidence admissible includes maps of the territory involved,
published by authority of law, as well as oral and written
evidence of the assumption and continuows exercise of
juris diction over the territory by one county. The testimony
of parties running county lines, of those present and asiSisting therein, and of those present and s·eeing the line as it
was run is competent and entitled to the greatest weight."
IN PUGET SOUND NAT. BANK OF SEATTLE v.
FISHER, Supreme Court of Washington, 1909, 100 P. 724,
the Court stated the rule to be as follows: "It would seem
that no hi~her and better evidenee could be offered than
that of assumption and continuous exercise of juriiSdiction
over the territory by one county for many years, extending
back beyond the memory of living witnesses and which
jurisdiction wals acquiesced in by the citizens of both counties to a comparatively recent time."
ln VIRGINIA v. TENNESSEE, 148 U. S. 503, Mr.
Justice Field in a case involving a disputed boundary which
had been by compact previously marked on what was
thought to be parallel 36°30' North Latitude and wihose
markings had been rendered difficult of certainty by obliteration 1stated: "The compact in this cas·e having received
the con.sent of Congress, though not in expr~s~ terms, yet
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impliedly, and subsequently, which is equally effective, became obligatory and binding upon all the citizens of both
Virginia and Tennessee. Nor is it any objection that there
may have· been errors in the line whi0h the states by their
compact sanctioned. A·fter such compacts have been adhered
to for years neither party can be absolved from them upon
showing errors, mistakes or misapprehension of their
terms, or in the line established; this is a complete and
perfect answe·r to the complainants' position in this case."
In INDIANA v. KENTUCKY, 136 U. S. Reports, Mr.
Justice Field on pa.ge 515 states: "It is an admission entit,led to great weight in explaining the cause of the states
general acquiescence, from the time it was admitted into
the Union up to the passage of that act, in the claim and
jurisdiction of Kentucky .... whilst on the part of Indiana
there was want of affirmative action in the ass·ertion of her
present claim, and a general acquiescence in the claim of
Kentucky; there ws affirmative action on the part of Kentucky in her assertion of her rights."
In the present case there is no question that the·re
was affirmative action on the part of Grand County in her
assertion of her rights as evidenced by the· very nature of
this case and there was a recognition of the line surveyed
and marked and monum·ented ,by the joint efrforts of the
two counties at least until very recent years ats evidenced
by the testimony of C. R. Christensen, the former Assessor
of San Juan County, whose testimony on this point is set
forth in detail on pages 34-35-36 of this Brie·f. Since Grand
County was exercising jurisdiction and oontrol over the
so-called disputed area. and levied, assessed and collected

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
taxes ·thereon without interruption by San Juan County,
it had no occasion to seek a judicial determination of its
common boundary with San Juan County. San Juan County
on the other hand conspicuously never sou~ht any legislative or judicial determination of its common boundary
until this suit was instituted on the 18th day of December,
1958, when it made affirmative allegations in its Complaint
that the Defendant assumes judsdiction over the disputed
area and its inhabitants and levies and collects taxes against
them and that Defendant would continue to do so unless rest~ained by Court Order from doing so. (Paragraph 10 of
Plaintiff's Complaint) Defendant admitted all of Plaintiff's
assertions. (Paragraph 10 of Defendant's Amended
Answer.)
All of the old p1ats of the Bureau of Land Management wthich are on file in the Utah State Land Office and
which are a pa~t of the evidence show the south line of
Township 26 South to be coincident with and the same line
as Parallel 38°30' North Latitude or show 38°30' North
Latitude to be slightly south of the south line of ToWil!'ship 26 South, and all of the old maps show the sout!h line
of Township 26 South to be the common boundary between
the two counties. (See Defendant's Exhibits 23 through 31.)
George M.. Bacon, former Utah State Engineer, on
September 5, 1925, in an exchange of correspondence with
F. B. Hammond, County Attorney of San Juan County,
stated that the South Township line of Township 26 South
"is meant to coincide with the line of Latitude 38°30' minutes No." (Defendant's Exhibit 67), and tihat he found "the
SE corner of Township 26 South, Range 23 East are given
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as located exactly at Latitude No. 38°30'."
Witness Hubert C. Lambert, Deputy Utah State E'ngineer, testified for the Plaintiff San Juan County that the
plats and maps of the earlier day·s show Latitude 38°30' as
close to or coincidtmtal with the south line of Township 26
South (Transcript lines 19 through 28, page 161.)
It is submitted that there i·s overwhelming proof that
the line found by the trial, marked and monumented by the
joint efforts of the two counties, and acquiesced in is not
indefinite and can now be determined and that it i~s for all
practical purposes the same line as the south line of Township 26 South, Salt Lake· Base and Meridian, and that it
was the obligation of tihe trial court to order that the old
survey conducted by the parti•es pursuant to law be· remarked and re-monumented if the old marks and monuments have become obs,cure.

Justice Field in discussing a similar question in the
case of VIRGINIA v. TENNESSEE, Supreme Court of the
of the United States, (supra) stated: "The commi1ssioners
appointed unde·r the act of Virginia of 1856, and under the
act of Tennessee 1858,. found ail of the old marks upon the
trees in the forest th~ough which the line estabHsihed ran
in the form of a diam~nd; and whenever they were indistinct, or, in the judgment of the commissioners, too far removed from each other, new marks were made upon the
trees, or if no trees were found at particular places to be
marked, monuments in stone were planted. Besides this, the
State of Virginia does not ask that the line of 1803 shall
be· re-run or re-ma.rked, but proposes .that a new boundary
line_ be _run. on the line of. 3.6 ° 30'. Tennessee does not ask
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that the line of 1803 be re-run or re-marked. Nevertheless,
under the prayer of Virginia for general relief, there can
be no objection to the restoration of any marks which may
be cfound to be obliterated and become indistinct upon the
line as, herein defined.
"Our judgment, therefore, is that the boundary line
established by the State of Virginia and Tennessee by the
Compact of 1803 is the true boundary betwe·en them, and
that on a proper application, based upon a showing that
any marks for identification of that line have been obliterated or have become indi,stinct, an order may he made, at
any time during the present term, for the restoration of
such marks without any change of the lines."

The same result was reached in the case of NEW
MEXICO v. COLORADO, 364 U. S. 296. In this case the
statutes cfixed the common boundary line 1between the two
states on the 37th parallel of north latitude between its
intersection with the 103rd on 109th meridians of longitude
west from Greenwich. In pointing up :the issues the Court
said, "The only dispute is as to the alleged location of this
line. Dicfferent surveys have been made. New Mexico alleges
in its hill that the true line is that which was surveyed
and marked by Howard B. Carpenter in 1903, and prays
that this be decreed to be the boundary. Colorado, in answer
and cross bill, alleges that the true line is that which was
surveyed and marked 1by Elhud N. Darling in 1868, and
extended by John J. Major and Levi S. Preston in 1874 and
1900; and prays that this Hne be decreed to be the boundary, and that, in so lfar as necessary it he restored and
re-marked.
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''When Carpenter made hi's' surve·y in 1903 'He was
not directed to retrace the lines previously established, but
was directed to make an independent survey, and was
specifically instructed to "obliterate" all evidences of corners and monuments that had been set by Darling."
The Court he·ld: "We have no occasion, how•ever, to
determine the question, or to settle the precise location of
the parallel line rus· an original matter, since·, upon the uncontradicted facts, it is entirely clear that the line of the
parallel as surveyed and marked by Darling westerly from
the Macomb monument, and by Major and Preston from
the Macomb .monument to the Preston monument, must
now be taken as the established boundary * * * *. From 1868,
when Darling ran and marked the line of the 37th parallel,
to 1919, when this suit was brought, a period of more than
half a century, this line was recognized and acquiesced in,
successively, as the boundary between the two Territories,
between the State of Colorado and the Territory of New
Mexico and between the two states. * * * * The effect of this
recognition of the Darling line by the United States was not
impaired by the temporary recognition of the Carpenter
line of the· General Land Office, from 1904 to 1908. * * * *
And independently o[ these matters New Mexico i·s bound
by its own recognition and adoption of the Darling line,
from 1912 to the beginning of this suit, after its admission
to statehood."
"Thh boundary line should now be resurveyed and
remarked by the commissione·r or commissioners appointed
by the Court; such action to be subject to its approval.
Missouri v. Iowa, supra p. 679 ; Indiana v. Kentucky 136
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U. S. 479, 519; Oklahoma v. Texas 260 U. S. 606, 640."
IN HUNT COUNTY v RAINS COUNTY, 7 SW 2d
648, the Texas Court in determining a similar case to the
one in dispute said: "And it is the firmly settled rule that
a court has no power to direct another 'survey to be made
and thereby establish another county boundary line different from the one estwblished at some former period, when
a county line has been once run, marked upon the ground
and established 'in accordance with law.' Jones v. Powers,
65 Tex 207; Pecos County v. Brewster County, (Tex Cir.
App.) 250 SW 310; Lampasos County v. Gorryell County,
27 Tex. Cir. App. 195, 65 SW 67."
Irf there is any question with respect to the exact
location of the marros and monuments which the county
surveyors by the·ir joint efforts placed upon the earth's
surface said line should be re-established and re-marked
in keeping with the authorities' above cited.

Under the provisions of 17-1-33 Utah Code Annotated,
1958, disputed or uncertain boundaries can be settled and
whe~e the ~statute has been followed, as in this case, the
boundaries so determined shall "be deemed permanent
until superseded by legislative enactment." In construing
stautes of thi~s kind the Defendant cites the Court the
following authorities as supporting its position in this case.
16 Corpu Juds Secundum, (Constitutional Law), Sec.
138, Section 15, page ·614, states:
"The power to fix the boundaries of political subdivisions cannot be delegated but details as to the de-
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.termination of the location of boundaries may be left
to administrative agencies."
The Oalifornia courts have supported the general
statement set forth above beginning with the case of
PEOPLE ex rei BORRELL v. BOGGS, 56 Cal. 648. "We
~think it was competent for the Leg1s1ature· to direct its
ofrfice'r to go upon the ground, run his lines along that ridge,
and in doing so he was acting merely in a ministerial capacity; and we think that it was competent for the Legislature
to declare that the lines so run that is the location of the
boundary line upon the ground should be thereby defined
and fixed."
The Supreme Court of California in a land mark case
entitled "TRINITY COUNTY v. MENDOCINO COUNTY,
90 P. 685,'' cited at great length here because of its extreme
similarity to the case at bar, assumed jurisdiction and determined the common boundary between Trinity County
and Mendocino County.
"It is conceded that if, after the survey was made,
the Legislature had enacted a law providing that the line
so marked ~sihould be the boundary line· between the counties
it would thereupon constitute such boundary, no matter
how much it deviated rfrom the true line or position of the
fortieth parallel, and that, even if such subsequent act was
passed in ignorance of the mistake or error in the survey,
it would make no difference· in this respect. But it is contended that it is not competent for the Legislature to declare, in advance of the work, that the line which mig'lht be
surveyed and marked by the surveyor should be the true
line. We can see no essential difference between the two
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propositions, so far as the mere matter of legislative power
is concerned. The rule in regard to such legislation is thus
stated by the authorities: 'The Legislature cannot delegate
the power to make laws, but it can delegate the power to
determine some fact or state of things upon which the law
makes or intends to make, its own action depend. Locke's
Appeal, 72 Pa. 491, 13 Am. Rep. 722; State v. Thompson,
160 Mo. 333, 60 S. W. 1077, 54 L. R. A. 950, 83 Am. St
Rep. 468; Boyd v. Bryant, 35 Ark. 69, 37 Am. Rep. 6; Pu~blo
Co. v. Smith, 22 Colo., 534,46 Pac. 360, 362, 33 L. R. A. 4'65;
in re Flaherty, 105 Cal. 558 38 Pac. 981, 27 L. R. A. 529; 8
Cyc. 830; 6 Am. & Eng. Ency. 1029, 1032. "':' * * * Here, the
Legislature having declared that the county boundary
,should be the forti•eth parallel, it further provided that its
location should be established by a surveyor and marked
accordingly, and that the line so fixed and marked should
be the true boundary. The surveyor was directed to ascertain the position of that parallel on the ground in accordance with the rules of his science and by means of the
instruments of his profession. The exact position was presumably unknown. Perhaps it may be said that it cannot,
by human means, be ascertained with absolute certainty.
It was the·re.fore competent for the Legislature to settle all
controversy over the question by providing for a survey
and dclaring in advance that the line as surveyed should
be the true boundary line. It cannot be conceded that the
Legislature cannot delegate the power to determine contrary to the fact. The power to decide necessarily includes
the power to decide erroneously; but the fact, once decided,
whether true or false, is nevertheless effective for its
purpose.
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"The act provided that the surveyor, when employed,
should 'accurately run' the line of the fortieth parallel. It
is contended that the e·ffect of this language is that if he
ran it inaccurately his survey would be void; that the words
quoted were a limitation upon ;bis power, such that he could
make no legal survey unle-ss it was •sufficiently clear by
Section 1 above quoted. That section manifestly was made
in view of the contingency that the survey might not he
absolutely correct, and its purpose and effect was that,
whether correct or not, the line surveyed and marked should
thereupon be the true line. The construction conte-nded for
would le·ave the county lines always subject to change and
uncertainty ; if the line- of that parallel and not any particular surveyed line thereof is to be the true county line,
it would be subject to relocation and change whene·ver new
discoveries, more accurate instruments or more careful
surveys should demonstrate- that the previously surveyed
line was incorrectly located on 'the ground. If the true line
of the parallel, and no other, was to be the lawful line-, the
surveying and marking of any line would accomplish nothing. It would, indeed, indicate the place where the- particular
surveyor ascertained and believed the position of the true
line to be, and to prove which might show it to be false,
and there would be no remedy, except by legislative act.
The matte·r of establishing a county boundary is for the
Legislature. If it has declared that the true line of the
parallel i·s the line, the courts cannot declare any other line
to be the boundary, in the absence of legislative authority
to so declare. The- Court can declare and construe the law
on the subject, but it cannot declare and establish the fact
that the parallel is situated el•sewhere than in its true· locaion; and, if that location is to be the sole criterion, the
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Court's decree must be as much subject to such inquiry and
dispute as the survey of any surveyor. It i~s not to be supposed that the Legislature intended to reduce the proposed
survey and location to such a mere idle ceremony.

"It is said that under the theory of the law the
surveyor might arbitrarily locate the line 10, 15 or even
50 miles d:'rom the true line. There 1s, no charge that the
surveyor fraudulently located the line. What the effect
would be if he did 1act fraudulently we need not decide. But,
so far as mere inaccuracy is concerned, it seems clear that
it would not affect the question. In any event, the location
of the county lines i~s a political question, to be settled by
the legislative power of the state, and subject to change
from time to time as the legislative power may direct. If
the line as fixed in accordance with its directions is inaccurately located by the person whom it has directed to
make the surv:ey and place the marks, the correction of the
error lies with the Legislature, and not with the courts,
unles~s it has provided that the courts shall determine the
true location, which it has not done. The finding of the Court
is that the common boundary line between Mendocino and
Trinity counties was, and ever since the Fauntleroy survey,
has been, adequately marked by monuments, lines and surveys lawfully made. Such being the fact, there was no
necessity or authority for a resurvey by the surveyor general, under Section 3969 of the Political Code, unless it
appeared that the monuments of the Fauntleroy survey had
been displaced or destroyed, so that this line was no longer
adequately marked. In that event the surveyor general
could be called upon to resurvey and mark the line under
the provisions of the Political Code above cited; but if he
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should be called upon to make ~surch survey, it would be the
Fauntleroy line which he must survey and mark, and not
the actual position of the fortieth parallel of north latitude.
"It is entirely immaterial whether there was, or was
not, a dispute concerning the location of the line when the
act of March 30, 1872, was pas,sed and the survey made
thereunder."

T1he arguments presented in the well reasoned land
mark case above set forth al"!e applicable in thi,s case.
The Legi,s.Jature on March 13, 1890, declared that the
common boundary between Grand and San Juan Counties
was paralle·l 38°30' North Latitude and provided a means
Wlhich disputed boundaries could he settled. The exact posiition of 38°30' North Latitude is still unmarked on the
earth',s, surface. The Legislature provided a means to settle
any disputed or uncertain boundary, and Grand and San
Juan Counties, having taken advantage of this law, fixed
and established the boundary wihic:h, according to the p}}Ovisions of the statute under which they acted, "shall be
deemed permanent until superseded by legislative enactment."

It is not questioned by the Defendant that with the
technological advancements that have been made since the
turn of the century that Parallel 38°30' North Latitude can
be more accurately marked on the earth's surface today
than it could have been marked then; nor is it questioned
that as man's knowledge of the earth's surface increase's
and technology advances further that at some later
date engineers and scientists will be able to more
accurately mark Parallel 38°30' North Latitude on the
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earth's surface than they can today. But are these two counties to be subjected to renew-ed and continued litigation each
time new discoveries, more accurate instruments, or more
technical surv-eys can be made? To answer this interrogatory in the affirmative would he to deny the Legislature
of its right to fix county boundaries and to reduce the joint
survey made, establish-ed and acqudesced in since 1912 to
a mere ceremony.
In the case of BARTON v. SANPETE COUNTY, 162
P. 611 (Utah), Dec. 29, 1916, the Court, at page 612, states:
"In 1907 in order to d-evise some method or means by which
disputed boundary lines, including the one in question here,
could defiruitely be fixed and •s-ettled, the Legislature enacted a statute (Comp. Laws 1907 Sec. 487), which reads
as follows: "(The statute in qu-estion is set out in full and
i•s' substantially the one cited to the Court in this case.) The
Utah Court said:
"1. The law, we think, is well settled that the Legis-

lature has the sole rpower to define and determdne the boundary lines between counties and to provide the means or
methods by which such boundaries, when in dispute, may
he established and marked upon the ground. The law is
tersely stated in 11 Cyc. 346, in the following words:
"'It rests with the Legislature of the state, not only
to defin-e the boundaries of counties, but also to provide the
means whereby the true localities of such boundaries on
the ground may be finally determined; and the settling of
th-e boundary lines of a county by an unauthorized survey
may be ratified by a curative act of the Legislature."
In the case of JONES v. POWERS, 65 Tex. page 207,
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cited with approval by the Utah Supreme Court in BARTON v. SANPETE COUNTY, the Court said:
"It rests with the Legislature to define the boun~
daries of counties and to provide the means whereby their
true localities on the ground may be determined, and when
these methods have been pursued and the line or lines so
es·tablished should be considered the true ones, whether
mathematically so or not. It is of more importance that the
lines be certain and well defined than that they be absolutely correct. If a di£ferent rule were adopted untold injury and confusion might result.

"The boundary lines of counties are matters of public
concern; and when the'Y have been run and their position
ascertained, by public authority, the actual line, though it
should vary from the descriptive boundary designated in
the s·tatute, must he conclusively binding upon all private
individuals and county officers, until a different position
is given to it by the publlic authorities. It is also familiar
principal in relation to boundary lines, and one which seems
applicable· to public as well as private boundaries, that
description course shall yield to a line actually run."
It is submitted here that the Courts of this State in
the proper exercise of the juris diction granted to them by
the Cons-titution of the State and the common law should,
under the circumstances and ~evidence in this case, declare
the line surveyed, marked, and acquiesced in, to be the true
common boundary between the two counties.

POINT II
San Juan County is ·bound by the acts of its county
commissioners in surveying, establishing, monumenting,
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and thereafter recognizing a line as the common boundary
line between the two counties· and is estopped by the doctrine of long possession, prescription, latches and acquiescence f~om now asserting a different boundary line and the
trial oourt erred in not making a finding on thi,s question.
At the pretrial hearing of this case, the trial court
properly framed as one of the issues to be determined in
this case "whether or not the parties have acquiesced in
th boundary now established upon the surface of the
surface of the earth."
The trial court completely neglected to make any
finding with respect to whether or not the parties had
acquies·ced in a line marked on the earth's surface.
It is submitted that there was such acquiescence and
that the evidence on this point is clear, uncontradicted, and
overwhelming that both parties have acquiesced in the line
so surveyed and the south line of Township 26 South as
the common boundary line between the two counties over a
long period of time.
Mr. Christensen, who participated in the joint survey
of the two counties, stated that after completing the survey
San Juan County used the line so surveyed in assessing the
property in San Juan County.
(The following is copied from the Transcript of Trial
Proeeeding·s, Volume II, beginning with line 8, page 483,
and ending on line 13, pa.ge 485.)
Q. Mr. Christensen, as the As~sessor of San Juan
County, did you abide by the line that was run on that
survey?
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MR. BURTON: We objected to it. No testimony
that ihe was the ass·essor.
MR. RUGGERI: Mr. Snow said "Oh, yes." Mr. Burton said, "Up to this time" and then I got into the act and
said "Yes, there was. He said he was the assessor." Mr. Burton ·said, "He said he had been at various time·s." The witne·ss said, "At that time." Mr. Burton said, "I submit on
the record. There is no qualification. I make my objection
:Dor that reason." Mr. Rug~ri: "Were you the assessor
at that time?"
A.

Yes·,. sir.

All right. Now as the ass:e-ssor did you abide by
the line that you had run in assessing the taxes· in Sam
Juan County?
Q.

MR. BURTON: I objected to that a calling for a
conclusion of the witness.
THE COURT:

Well, he may answer.

I will ask you again, Mr. Chriostensen. As the
assessor of San Juan County, did you abide by this line that
you had run :between the two counties in assessing the
property of San Juan County?
Q.

*

* * *

(Argument to Court.)
MR. RUGGERI: And then this question was asked:
"Did you assess· up to this line that you esta;blished ?"
MR. BURTON:
suggestive.
THE COURT:

I objected to that as leading and
He may answer that question.
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A. Well, it was g.enerally, pretty generally unders,tood. We knew the boys along the line there and about the
only difficulty I ever had was a bunch of ste-ers left here
one spring and they wrote they, that they hadn't been
assessed. And I followed that bunch of steeT!s to Bed Rock,
Colorado, to get the taxes on them.
Q. Well, now, the real property, did you have any
trouble in asses,sing the real property after that?

MR. BURTIN: Then, objected to that as calling for
a conclusion of the witness.
THE COURT:

He may answer.

A. Well, I couldn't answer it. I never had any
difficulty.
Q.

Now you s·aid-is that the line that you used?

MR. BURTON: I objected to that. It's incompetent,
irrele'Vant and immaterial.
MR. RUGGE'RI: The witness requested the question, and this question was asked:
"Now, the line, this boundary line that you made
and put up, is that the line you used in assessing
·p:voperty ?"
A

Yes, sir.

Misrs Marian Bayles, the present Treasurer of San
Juan County, on cross-examination testified that San Juan
Ciunty was not and to her knowledge had not collected real
property taxes in any of the disputed area when the following question was put to her:
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Q. So that San Juan, as far as you know, at least,
hasn't collelcted any real property taxes for property
located in this oo-called disputed area, is that right, as
far as you know?

A. Not ·to my knowledge. (Transcript lines 28,
29, 30, page 301, and lines 1 and 2, page 302.)

It is significant that San Juan did not bring this
action until December, 1958, some forty-six ( 46) years
after the joint survey was· made, and then the action was
bvought for the purpose of restraining the Defendant
Grand County, its officers and agents from exercising
jurisdiction over the so-called "di·sputed area" and for an
accounting to re·cover taxes admittedly collected by Grand
County in its exercise of jurisdiction over said so-called
disputed area.
The Plaintiff introduced evidence that San Juan
County paid Grand County for maintaining roads located
in the so-called disputed area for the years beginning with
1955, (see testimony of Ada Palmer, San Juan Clerk, beginning page 305), and collected taxes fl'lom the Utah
Power and Light Company and the Pacicfic Northwest Pipeline Company for the years 1956, 1957, 1958 and 1959 in an
apparent attempt to show lack of acquies•cence. These feeble
and be1lated attempts on the part of San Juan County to
contradict the facts aflfirmatively pleaded by it, and admitted by the defendant, do not change the fact that for a
long, long period of years both the plaint1ff and defendant
treated the south line of Township 26 South, and the joint
survey conducted by the parties in 1912 as the common
boundary line between them and that said line was
a~Cquiesced as the common boundary and •should _now be ·
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declared by the Court to be the common boundary as a
matter of law.
As late as September 12, 1953, the County of San
Juan, by and through its County Commissioners, deeded
certain land in San Juan County [or the Grand County Airport, recognizing the south line oif Township 26 South to
be the common boundary line betwee·n the two counties
and that in the years 1956 and 1958, Grand County was
asserting affirmative jurisdiction and control over all of
said so-called disputed area. (See .A!bstract of Title to the
Grand County Airport, marked Defendant's Exhibit 32.)
McQuillen in Municipal Corporations, 3rd Edition,
Volume 2, Section 7.09 states the rule of law applicable as
follows:
"Long acqui·escence in the location of municipal
boundaries by the local corporation and the inhabitants
thereof where all municipal ,action and improvements
have been done under the assumption that such are the
boundaries, notwithstanding they were not originally
so located and hence, indefinite and uncertain." * * * *
When the boundaries of a municipal corporation become
ancient and are unmarked by artificial monuments, they
may be proved by general reputation, in the absence of
higher evidence."
C. J. S. 20, (Counties) Sec. 22, page 773. "Long usage,
acquiescence in, and recognition of a particular boundary
as the true county boundary line may .have the effect of
establishing it as such"
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of SUMMIT
COUNTY v. RICH COUNTY 224 P. 653, cited earlier, seems
to recognize the doctrine of acquiescence when it states on
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page 655: "It is made to appear that the o£fieial·s of both
Rich County and Summit County for many years acquiesced in the fact that the dispute area was a part of Summit
County."
WASHINGTON ROCK CO. v. YOUNG, 29 Utah 108.
"The law is well setUed that an original survey of
lands, upon the faith of which property rights have been
based and acquired, controls over surveys subsequently
made which injuriously affects •such rights."
IN RHODE ISLAND v. MASSACHUSETTS, 4 How
591, decided in 1846, it was alleged by Rhode Island that
there was a mistake in the location of the boundary line
between said states ; the Bill was dismissed; the Court said:
"More than two centuries have passed since Massachusetts
clajmed and took possession of the territory up to the line
established by Woodward and Saffrey. This possession has
ever since been steadily maintained, under an ass·ertion of
right. It would be difficult to disturb a claim thus sanctioned by time, however unfounded it might have been in
its origin. * * * * Surely this, connected with the lap,se of
time, must remove all doubt as to the right of the respondent under the agreement of 1711 and 1718. No human
transactions are unaffected by time. Its influence is seen
on all things subject to change. And this is peculiarly the
case in regard to matters which rest in memory, and which
consequently fade with the lapse of time, and £ail with the
lives of individuals. For the security of rights, whether of
states or individuals, long possession under a claim of title
is protected. And there is no controversy in which this
great principle may be involved with greater justice and
property than in a case of di·sputed boundary."
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In INDIANA v. KENTUCKY, 136 U. S. 479, the territory in dispute was an island in the Ohio River, over which
Kentucky had long exercised dominion and sovereignty. In
its opinion this Court said:
"Thi·s long acquiesence in the exercise by Kentucky
of dominion and jurisdiction over the island is more potential tha,n the recollections of all the witnesses produced on
either side. Such acquiesence in the a·ssertion of authority
by the State of Kentucky, such omission to take any steps
to assert her pres,ent claim by the State of Indiana, can
only he regarded as a recognition of the right of Kentucky
too plaint to be overcome, except by the clearest and most
unquesUoned pr.oof. It is a principle of public law unive~
sally recognized, that long acquiesence in the possession of
territory and in the exercise of dominion and sovereignty
over it, is oonclusive of the nation's tit1e and rightful
authority."
VIRGINIA v. TENNESSEE, 148 U. S. 503, the Supreme Court in a case where the contention that the common boundary line does not follow the parallel of 36 o and
30' north but varies from it by running too far north, the
Court said:
"A boundary line between states or provinces as between private pe·rsons, which has been run out, located and
marked upon the earth, and afterwards recognized and
acquiesced in by the parties, for a long course of years, is
conclusive, even if it be ascertained that it varies somewhat
from the cours;es given in the original grant, and the line so
established takes ·effect, not as an alienation of territory
but as a true and ancient boundary. Lord Hardwichs in
Penn. v. Lord Bltimore, 1 Vesey Sen. 444, 448; Boyd v.
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Graves, 4 Wheat 513, Rhode Island v. Mass. 12 Pet. 65, 734;
United States v. Stone, 2 Wall, 525, 537; Kellogg v. Smith,
7 Cush., 375, 382; Chenery v. Waltham, 8 Cush., 327; Hunt
on Boundarie·s 3rd Edition 306.''
HUNT COUNTY v. RAINS COUNTY, 116 Tex. 277,
7 S. W. page 655.
"In sound policy a county line thai has bee-n located
and acquiesced in for many years, as here, should not be
changed unless e-xpressly required by law to be done, even
though such line was not the correct one in the first instance for interminable confusion would result from the
change of conditions orf such long standing. Road and •school
bond issues would be affected, as well as individual privileges and status in respect to this line."
It was said in the case of CITY OF RACINE v. EMMERSON, 85 Wis., 80-86: "The public and private owners
have acquiesced in the- lines es£abHshed by the first and
original survey and plat, and by practical location and undisturbed possession for a great many years, and there does
not seem to have been any necessity to disturb them at this
late day. The judgment of the Circuit Court i~s reversed,
and the cause remanded with dir.e-ction to enter judgment
in favor of the defendant."

MARYLAND v. WEST VIRGINIA, 217 U. S. 1, is
directly in point. It was contended by Maryland and apparently not disputed by West Virginia, that the survey of the
new meridian contended for by Maryland was much more
accurate than the old established and recognized line. West
Virginia contended that the long recognized line was the
boundary notwithstanding its jog, irregularities, imperfe·c-
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tions and dtff>erent location and regardless of the fact that
it was not intended as a fixation of an inter-state boundary line Wihen it was surveyed. The Court sustained the
claims of West Virginia and caused the long recognized
boundary to be resurveyed and remonumented by oommis,sioners.
"In this case we think a right, in its nature prescriptive, has arisen, practically undisturbed for many years,
not to be overthrown without doing violence to principles
of established rigllt and justice· equally binding upon states
and individuals. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657.
"Upon the whole case, the conclusions at which we
1have arrived, we believe, best meet the facts disclosed in
this record, are warranted by the applicable principles of
law and equity, and will least disturb rights and title long
regarded as se-ttl>ed and fixed by the people most to be
be affected."
Both counties having treated the line estahlished by
the joint survey of the two counties as their common boundary, the Court should have entered -a finding of fact in
thi~s regard and concluded, as a matter of law, that the line
so long acquiesced in, is the common boundary between the
two counties.
POINT III.
The Court should have determined as a matter of law
that 38°30' North Latitude, as historically marked and
monumented, is the common boundary line between the
two counties and was what the Legislature creating the
counties intended as the true common boundary between
the counties.
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Artide· XI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Utah,
insofar as applicable, reads as follows :
"Section 1. (Existing counties, precincts and school
districts recognized) .
"The ·several counties of the Territory of Utah, existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution are
hereby recognized as l.egal subdivisions of this State, and
,the precincts, a.nd school di·stricts, now existing in said
counties, as legal subdivisions thereof, and they shall so continue until changed by law in pu~suance of this Article.
"Section 2. (Removal of County seats.)
"Section 3. (Changing County Lines.)
"No territory shall be stricken from any county unless a majority of the voters living in such territory, a1s weU
as the county to which it is to be annexed, shall vote therefor, and then only under suC!h conditions as may be prescribed by general law."
In the second Utah case of SUMMIT COUNTY v.
RICH COUNTY, '224 P. 653, the Utah Court in interpreting
the provisions of the state constitution quoted above, statoes
as follows: "The following legal propositions, in the opinion of the writer, are fairly deducible from the opinions o:f
the court in thoese cases: (a) that the Legislature by reason
of the provisions of Section 3, Art. 11, of the Constitution
quoted, is without authority by legislative act or otherwise to e-stablish or locate new or any boundary line between
counties where a boundary line exists, unless the description of the boundary line is so indefinite, uncertain or
ambiguous that the line cannot be definitely determined
from the description of it given, or for any other reason
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the line cannot be located on the ground. (b) that the Legislature must, in atte·mpting to establish the correct boundary line, so far as possible, establish and determine the
boundary line so as to carry into effect and make certain
the boundary line· as it was intended to be established and
fixed prior to the enactment of the correcting legislative
act. (c) that any act of the Legislature that attempts to
establish a diffe-rent or new boundary line wihout regard
to the line so originally intended to be established is void
as being within the inhibition of the Constitution."

"* * * * In so establishing the line, the Legislature
!clearly faled to carry into effect the intent of the Territorial Legislature in its effort to establish the boundary
line between Summit County and Rich County. If the legal
conclusions hereinbefore stated are rightly deducible from
the opinions of this Court on the former appeal of this case
and in the Barton case, supra, respecting the power and
duty of the Legislature with reference to the establishment
of boundary lines between counties, then it must necessarily
follow that the act of the Legislature of 1917, in determining and fixing the boundary line as the same affects the
area in dispute and he·rein questioned is in contravention of
the provi,sions of our State Constitution and is therefore
null and void.
" (4) We are not unmindful of the rule of law and
courts will not declare an act of the Legislature unconstitu<t~onal if by any consistent reasoning it can be held to be
otherwise. If, however, appearing from this record that
the Le·gislature, in establishing the boundary line between
Summit County and Rich County by the act of 1917, disregarded the plain intent of the Territorial Legislature in
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fixing the boundary line between such counti.e·s, thereby
detaching from Summit County the dis.puted area which
clearly was within that county under the description of the
formerly e·staJblished boundary, we can see no escape from
the conclusion that the lower court was right in declaring
and holding the Act of the 1917 Legislature unconstitutional and therefore void."
The old plats on file with the· State Land Office and
the Bureau Oif Land Management •show that there were surveys conducted and that the surveyors of the day placed
Parallel 38 ° 30' North Latitude and the south line of Township 26 South as the· same line. See Defendant'·s Exhibit 23
which plat was referred to by State Engineer Bacon in
1925, wihen he stnted in a letter addressed to the County
Attorney of San Juan County, as follows:
"On looking into the· •situation in the Surveyor
General's Of.fice I find that the south township line of
Township 26 South is meant to coincide with a line at
latitude of 38 ° degrees 30 minutes No. Owing to field
errors there may be a slight variation but I do not consider it at all material when weighed against the fact
of having this line definitely and plainly marked on the
ground as would be the case of a township line. There
is also the big advantage of having all legal descriptions
of land reach right to the county line as would be the
c3ise when this line coincided with a legal subdivision
line. I find that the SE corner of Township 26 South,
Range 22 East, and also the SE corner of Township 26
South, Range ·23 East are given as located exactly at
latitude No. 38°30'."
Mr. Lambe·rt testified as follows :
"Q.

From your observations from those particular
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maps and plats, do you think that the-do you concur with
the opinion of Mr. Bacon in that letter that it indicates
that the south line of Township 26 South is the common
boundary line between the two counties? (Lines 25 through
29, page 160.)
A. As far as Mr. Ba.con is concerned, I think he can
ihave his opinion. From what I have seen of the Township
plat and the designation on the Township plats and some
of the old ones in the early daJlS, the latitude of 38°30' is
designated on those plats as fairly close to the south bounda.ry of Township 26. (Lines 19 through 24, page 161.)
Q.

And some of them it's actually coincidental?

A. That's right. It actually crosses at some places
and no Township line could be concurrent to a parallel."
(Lines 25 through 27, page 161.)
The evidence sihows that all of the old maps place the
common boundary of Emery County, from which Grand
County was originally f.ormed, and San Juan County, and
later Grand and San Juan Counties, to be on the south line
of Township 26 South, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (See
Defendant's Exhibits 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31.)
Mr. Hubert Lambert, testifying on cross-examination,
stated as follows:
"Q. Plaintiff's EXJhibit 25 and ask you if you can
identify that document.

A. Well, it's a General Land Office map of the
Territory of Utah, published in 1884. (Lines 19 through 22,
page 166, Transcript of Trial Proceedings, Volume I.)
THE COURT:

What was the question,
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MR. RUGGERI: I simply asked, Your Honor, from
observing this map and the legend identifying county boundaries thereon whether or not that map, dated 1884, shows
tlhe officialness of it on its face·, shows that the common
boundary line between Grand and San Juan Counties is
coincidental with and the same line- as the south line of 26
South.
THE COURT:

He may answer that.

A. The- map indicates that the south boundary of
Township 26 South is the same as the boundary between
Emery County and San Juan, not Grand. (Lines 22 through
30, page 168, and lines 1 and 2, page 169.)
Q. I show you what has been marked for identification as Derfendant's Exhibit No. 31 and ask you if you can
identify that?

A. This is a map o[ the Territory of Utah issued1889 by the Department of the Interior, the General Land
Office.
Q. And does it have a 1e·~nd for the county boundaries on it? (Lines 17 through 25, page 160.)

A. There is no designation in the legend, for county
lines. However, the county lines are marked by heavy black
lines ajs indicated ·oy the names of the counties and the
boundaries thereof.
Q. Is the heavy black line in the same place as the
south line of Township 26 South as shown on thi~s map?

A. In the instance of two~f two townships the line
is coincidental between Emery and San Juan. The rest o[
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the county line doe1s not show designation in this particular
map. Just in this particular map. Just two townships on
the east side. (Lines 13 through 26, page 170.)
Q. (By Mr. Ruggeri) I show you what has been
marked as Exhibit 27 and ask you if you can identify that?

A. This is a map of the State of Utah issued in 1902
by the- General Land Office under the direction of Harry
Keen the Chief of the Drafting Division.
Q. Does thi~s particular map have a legend for boundaries for counties on it?

A. This map has a legend for boundaries of counties
in he·avy dark lines.
~Q. Does that boundary coincide with, or is it, according to this map, coincidental as shown on this map
with the south line of Township 26 South? (Lines 15
through 27, page 174.)

A. Well, as near as can be determined from the map,
the line- is between figures 26 and 27 with no other line and
designa~ted as the boundary of 26 and 27, and, therefore, I
think you would have to assume from the map that the
heavy line is the county line on the south line of 26. * * * *
(ines 8 through 17, page 175.)
Similar examination went on with respect to Defendant'~s Exhibits 28, 29, and 30. (See transcript pages 175
throuwh 182.)
The Legislature creating Grand County in 1890, using
the maps and plats available to it at that time, intended
the common boundary line between the two countie·s to be
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established at the location :shown on said maps and plats
and could not have intended that the common boundary
line between Grand and San Juan Counties to be fixed by
a Coast and Geodetic Reconnaissance conducted in 1958
with the aid of pre-cision instruments and an elaborate network of triangulation stations, neither of which were available in 1890.
In applying the rule laid down in the SUMMIT
COUNTY v. RICH COUNTY case it is evident that the Legislato~s creating Grand County were looking at maps that
showed that the common boundary line between the two
counties were coincidental with and the same line as Township 26 South, Salt L.a,ke Base and Meridian, and that the
court should have declared said line rus the common boundary line between the two counties as a matter of law.

CONCLUSION
The evidence shows:
1. 'IThat the county surveyors of the two counties
surveyed a line and marked and monumented it in the year
1912 in an attemJ}t to give a pra~tical interpretation and
meaning to Parallel 38 °30' North Latitude.
2. That the joint survey conducted by the counties
in 1912 is substantially the same as the south line of Town-

ship 26 South, Salt Lake Ba:se and Meridian.
3. That all of the old maps which antedate the creation of Grand County show the south line of Township 26
South to be the common boundary line between the two
counties.
4. That many of the old plats show the south line of
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Township 26 South to be coincident with and the same line
as Parallel38°30' North Latitude.
5. That the State Engineer on September 5, 1925,
advised the San Juan County officials that the "South
Township line of Township 26 South is meant to coincide
with a line at latitude 38°30' No."
6. That Mr. Lambert, the present Utah Deputy State
Engineer, ooncurs in 1959, with the conclusion of Mr. Bacon.
7. That the two counties acquiesced in said line so
marked and monumented until very recent times.
8. That no legislative or judicial determination of
the common boundary line between the two counties was
sougiht by San Juan County until it filed this action on
December 18, 1958.
9. That when San Juan County brought this action
it did not bring its action to relocate and remark the boundary line previously marked, monumented and acquiesced
in, but it brought the action to move the common boundary
an indefinite and undetermined distance approximately 2/3
of a mile north of 'the south line of Township 26 South, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian.
10. That the only reference to any fixed or definitely
ascertainable place on the earth's surface mentioned in
Plaintiff's Complaint is the south line of Township 26
South, Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
11he Defendant is entitled to a judicial determination
that its common boundary with the Plaintiff County has
been established hy the counties pursuant to law, and
acquiesced in over a long period of time, and is as historl·
cally designated.
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